SUITS ABOUT NOTHING: DOES THE SEINFELD
CASE INDICATE THAT BUSINESSES NEED TO
RECONSIDER THE RIGHTS OF EMPLOYEES
ACCUSED OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT?
Richard D. Suttont
Imagine that you are the in-house counsel for the Ostrich Corporation,
a large national business whose headquarters is located in a major industrial
city in the United States. The C.E.O. of Ostrich has called you into his
office to discuss the possible termination of Harry Harried, an eighteenyear employee with the company who has reached the level of senior
manager and who is earning a salary of $70,000 a year. One of his female
assistants has accused Harried of committing a series of sexually harassing
actions. After examination of the incidents, and despite Harried's firm
denials, the C.E.O. is convinced that the charges are true. Considering that
Harried staunchly refuses to admit any wrongdoing and claims that he is
being falsely maligned by the female assistant, the C.E.O. of Ostrich seeks
your advice on whether there will be any possible repercussions if he
terminates Harried's employment.
Mr. Harried's chances of succeeding in any action against the Ostrich
Corporation will be quite slim.1 Whatever the justification for a plaintiff's
claim, suits brought by alleged harassers have generally faced a cool
reception from the courts. 2 Many actions are lost at the summary judgment
phase of a trial, with judges placing a very high bar for plaintiffs to get over
before a case will reach a jury. However, the relatively recent flood of
litigation by alleged harassers3 has also resulted in some success for these

t B.A. 1988, Colgate University; M.A. 1990, New York University Graduate School
of Journalism; J.D. 1999, University of Pennsylvania Law School. The author wishes to
thank George and Dolores Sutton for their continued support and encouragement.
1. See Alba Conte, When the Tables Are Turned: Courts ConsiderSuits by Alleged
Sexual Harassers,TRIAL, Mar. 1996, at 30.
2. See id. Except when the discipline was clearly improper, judges have supported
employers in their efforts to curb sexual harassment in the workplace.
3. Since 1992, suits by alleged harassers have multiplied tremendously and have been
brought under an increasing range of theories. See Hope A. Comsky, Beware of the Alleged
Harasser-Lawsuitsby Those Accused of Sexual Harassment,12 LAB. LAW. 277 (1996).
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types of claims. The most notable verdict came from the action Jerold
Mackenzie brought against the Miller Brewing Company in the so-called
"Seinfeld case. ' 4 After being fired, in part for discussing a bawdy episode
of the Seinfeld television program with a female coworker, Mackenzie sued
Miller Brewing Company, Miller Vice President Robert Smith, and the
female coworker who made the initial allegation and won a $26.6 million
jury verdict in July 1997. 5 While the result in this case is certainly an
exception to the fate of most claims brought by alleged harassers, some
attorneys argue that the jury was sending the message that the management
of companies may be overreacting to charges of harassment and that
alleged harassers have rights that should be protected as well. 6
The verdict also puts companies in the difficult position of being
damned if they take swift action against a possible harasser and damned if
they take little or no action. As one attorney noted after the judgment,
employers will now worry "if they don't act on harassment, they'll be in
Monday's paper for an $18 million verdict. If they do act, they'll be in
Tuesday's paper for a $26.6 million verdict." 7 Some argue that companies
should pause and reconsider their policies toward alleged harassers, on the
grounds that fear of liability and political correctness have pushed
businesses to approach those accused of violations with excessive
harshness. 8 Opponents contend, however, that big verdicts like the one in

4. Mackenzie v. Miller Brewing Co., JVR No. 201569, 1997 WL 463195 (Wis. Cir.
Ct. July 1997) (LRP Jury).
5. See Julie M. Buchanan, 'Seinfeld' Case Creates New Concern About Firing:
Wrongful Termination Becomes Issue, Rather Than InappropriateConduct, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, July 21, 1997, at 11. The Seinfeld case is unique for several reasons, discussed
infra Part IV, but certainly for the way that damages were spread amongst the losing parties.
The award included $24.5 million against Miller Brewing Company, $1.5 million against
Patricia Best, the female coworker who complained, and $601,500 against Miller executive
Robert Smith. See Ex-Miller Exec Wins $26-Million Verdict in 'Seinfeld' Case,L.A. TIMES,
July 16, 1997, at D1. The Seinfeld award is one of the largest jury awards in such cases;
rarely do such awards survive on appeal. See id. On October 6, 1997, Circuit Judge Louise
Tesmer dropped the $1.5 million punitive damages assessed against Best and reduced
Smith's damages to $100,000. See Dave Daly, Most of "Seinfeld" Award Stands,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, October 7, 1997, at 1, available in 1997 WL 12758265. The
$24.5 million judgment against Miller itself, including more than $17 million in punitive
damages, remains in place pending further appeal. See No Punitives in Seinfeld Suit, Judge
Rules, THE DAILY REc., Oct. 8, 1997, at 17, availablein 1997 WL 17886166.
6. See Jon Tevlin, "Seinfeld" Case is No Joke for Companies, Workers: Sexharassment Suit Prompts Discussion, MNNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL TRm., July 17, 1997, at 1A,
available in 1997 WL 7574372. Attorney Linda Holstein called the judgment "an
overreaction" but noted that the verdict probably shows that ordinary people are becoming
fed up with the extent of sexual harassment suits. See id.
7. Cary Spivak, Crackdown on Sexism Can Backfire: Firing an Accused HarasserCan
Lead to a RetaliatorySuit, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 4, 1997, at B1.
8. See Marshall H. Tanick, No Rhyme or Reason for Seinfeld Firing,NAT'L L.J., Aug.
18, 1997, at A19.
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Mackenzie v. Miller Brewing Company are examples of employment law
spinning out of control because the first reaction of many individuals
involved in a work-related dispute is to take some type of litigious action.9
This comment will explore how courts have dealt with actions brought
by those accused of sexual harassment, specifically by examining the
impact large jury verdicts such as in the Seinfeld case, have and should
have on a company's policy toward sexual harassment. Unsuccessful suits
brought by those terminated for harassment will be examined first to show
how many courts have implicitly mandated that employers implement
strong policies against sexual harassment, and how some courts have
approved the strict enforcement of these policies. Successful claims by
harassers will be analyzed next, focusing specifically on the Seinfeld case.
Finally, this comment will consider whether verdicts in favor of harassers
really indicate that companies need to change the way they approach
internal investigations of violative behavior.

I.

A BRIEF DEFINITION OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT

Because of the large amount of publicity afforded to complaints by
women like Anita Hill and Paula Jones and the proliferation of on-the-job
sensitivity training, most Americans are familiar with the basic concept of
sexual harassment inthe workplace. It is, however, worthwhile to briefly
examine the precise legal definition of sexual harassment before exploring
the remedies available to one who has been accused of the act. l1
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it "an unlawful
employment practice for an employer.., to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or

9. See Ron Arias & Walter Olson, Pink-Slip Panther Author Walter Olson Argues
Dumb Laws Make it Too Hard to FireBad Apples, PEOPLE, Aug. 11, 1997, at 81, available
in 1997 WL 8505344.
10. Obviously, this section is meant to provide only a thumbnail sketch of the basic
sexual harassment claim. The literature on the subject is now quite vast, but sources to
begin an extensive review include JOSEPH PELLiCCiuOTTI, TITLE VII LIABILITY FOR SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE 41 (1988); Nancy L. Abell et al., Circuit by Circuit
Review of Selected Sexual HarassmentIssues, in SEXUAL HARASSMENT LITIGATION 1995, at
105 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 520, 1995); Jana Howard
Carey & Theresa C. Mannion, New Developments in the Law of Sexual Harassmentfrom
Meritor to Harris, Karibian and Steiner, in SEXUAL HARASsMENT LIT GATON 1995, at 7 (PLI
Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 524, 1995); Susan M. Faccenda, The
Emerging Law of Sexual Harassment: Relief Available to the Public Employee, 62 NOTRE
DANME L. REv. 677 (1987); David Kadue, Sexual Harassment at Work, in EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIINATION AND CIvIL RIGHTS ACTIONS IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 1992, at 465

(ALI-ABA Course of Study No. C742, 1992). See also B. LmIDEMANN & DAvm KADUE,
SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT LAW (1992).
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national origin.' The prohibition against sex discrimination was added to
Title VII at the last minute by the House of Representatives, thus there is12
little legislative history to guide courts in interpreting this part of the Act.
Most states have followed Congress' lead in passing statutes forbidding
discrimination in employment on the basis of sex. 3 Most jurisdictions now
recognize liability for sexual harassment whenever an individual suffers
unwelcome conduct because of the individual's gender when that conduct

affects the individual's employment and when the individual's employer is
responsible
for perpetrating, failing to prevent, or failing to correct the
14
conduct.

Two basic legal doctrines have been developed to explain how sexual
harassment at work is equivalent to sexual discrimination in employment. 5
The first theory, "quid pro quo" harassment, "involves the conditioning of
concrete employment benefits on sexual favors."' 6 Thus, if an employer
were accused of conditioning a subordinate's raise or continued
employment on the subordinate's engaging in a sexual act with the
employer, the charge would be for quid pro quo harassment. In Meritor
Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,17 the Supreme Court recognized a cause of
action under Title VII for a "hostile work environment,"'" the second
classification of sexual harassment. In that case, the Court found that the
language of Title VII is "not limited to 'economic' or 'tangible'

11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
12. See 110 CONG. REc. 2577-84 (1964).
13. See Kadue, supra note 10, at 471.
14. See id.
15. See id. at 474. The impetus behind these two theories was Professor Catherine
MacKinnon's book entitled SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX
DIscRImINATION (1979).
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
endorsed these theories in 1980 when it issued its guidelines on the sex discrimination ban
of Title VII. See Kadue, supra note 10, at 474. The 1980 guidelines explain that:
Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of Sec. 703 of Title VII.
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors and other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1)
submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or
condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such
conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting
such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive working environment.
EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a) (1999).
16. Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). This case is worth noting
both as the first major Supreme Court decision on sexual harassment and as the case in
which the Court endorsed both the quid pro quo and hostile environment theories of
liability. See Kadue, supra note 10, at 476.
17. 477 U.S. at 73.
18. See id.
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discrimination [and that the] phrase 'terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment' evinces a congressional intent 'to strike at the entire spectrum
of disparate treatment of men and women' in employment." 19 Title VII is
violated then when a workplace is permeated with discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is "sufficiently severe or pervasive to
alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive
working environment." 20 While the majority of harassment suits are
brought as hostile environment claims, an exact definition of what
constitutes an "abusive environment" continues to elude courts and
businesses alike. 2
The 1991 Civil Rights Ace 2 added one more weapon to the arsenal of
those suing for sexual harassment by increasing the money damages that
workers receive if they can prove that discrimination occurred at the
workplace.2' Before passage of the Act, most workers who could prove
discrimination would be reimbursed only for their lost back pay with
interest.24 Since 1991, however, victims of harassment can receive money
for compensatory and punitive damages if they prove that there was
malicious and illegal behavior resulting in stress and humiliation,
or that a
5
company did not take corrective action quickly enough*2
Employers face even more liability after the recent Supreme Court
decisions of Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth 6 and Faragherv. Boca
Raton.27 While employers had previously been held vicariously liable
under Title VII for the offending conduct of their employees of which they
knew or should have known, the Court, in these decisions, held that
employers would be liable for any harassment by an employee that caused
a tangible job detriment even if the behavior caused no harm.2s Under
these new guidelines, an employer will be vicariously liable:
19. Id. at 64.
20. Id. at 67.
21. For example, in Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 957 (1972), the court said it is possible to "envision working environments so heavily
polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional and psychological
stability of minority workers." Id. at 238. However, in Harrisv. Forklift Systems, Inc., the
Supreme Court held that an abusive work environment need not seriously affect an
employee's psychological well-being or lead the employee to suffer injury. The Court
instead used a lower standard, requiring only that the employee be genuinely offended by
the conduct. See 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
22. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
23. See Federal Courts Awash in Lawsuits Alleging Workplace Bias: Why Suits Are
Soaring,OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, May 12, 1997, at 1, availablein 1997 WL 6302706.
24. See id.

25. See id.
26. 524 U.S. 742, 118 S.Ct. 2257 (1998).
27. 524 U.S. 775, 118S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
28. See Burlington, 118 S.Ct. at 2270; Faragher,118 S.Ct. at 2293.
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to a victimized employee for an actionable hostile environment
created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher)
authority over the employee. When no tangible employment
action is taken, a defending employer may raise an affirmative
defense to liability or damages, subject to proof by a
preponderance of the evidence.29
To take advantage of this affirmative defense, an employer must prove
that he "(a)... exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly
any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise."30 The
Court also stresses that while "proof that an employer had promulgated an
anti-harassment policy with a complaint procedure is not necessary in
every instance as a matter of law, the need for a stated policy suitable to the
employment circumstances may appropriately be addressed in any case
when litigating the first element of the defense. 3 1
Because of the ever-increasing burden on employers to ferret out and
eliminate harassment in the workplace, it is no wonder that employers are
creating stricter policies and sterner punishments to deal with employees
accused of committing Title VII violations. This in turn leads to a more
rigid workplace environment.
With this basic overview of harassment law in mind,32 we turn to the
specific types of claims alleged harassers have unsuccessfully brought
against employers who have fired them. These claims demonstrate how
many courts have condoned and even encouraged the tough antiharassment policies of businesses and employers.
II.

TITLE VII ACTIONS BY ALLEGED HARASSERS
"The annual cost of sexual harassment for each Fortune 500 company

29. Burlington, 118 S.Ct. at 2270.
30. Id.
31. Id. Note that no affirmative defense is available when the supervisor's harassment
culminates in a tangible employment action, such as discharge, demotion, or undesirable
reassignment. See id.
32. One should also note that a third offshoot of the two types of harassment charges
discussed above involves claims by an "indirect victim." Several courts and the EEOC have
also recognized liability where an individual suffers harm from conduct that is directed to
other persons or that is not directed to anyone in particular. See Kadue, supra note 10, at
477. Four different types of conduct raise issues of liability in this context: (1) quid pro quo
harassment that results in sexual favoritism to the detriment of persons who were not
subjected to the harassment; (2) consensual sexual favoritism that results in job detriments
to non-favored employees; (3) hostile conduct directed toward one employee that affects
other employees; and (4) widespread consensual sexual conduct that is not directed at the
complainant but is offensive to the complainant because of his or her sex. See id.
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is $6.7 million. 33 In trying to fend off costly and embarrassing legal
claims, many companies have set high standards for acceptable behavior,
often higher than the law requires, 4 and have vigorously enforced their
sexual harassment policies. The majority of courts have sided with
businesses that take an aggressive approach; many lawsuits brought by
workers terminated for harassment charges are dismissed in the summary
judgment phase. This court-imposed bar that a plaintiff accused of
harassment must hurdle can be seen as a type of tacit approval of strict
internal policies against harassment by employers. Despite the slim
chances for success, alleged harassers continue to bring suits under a
progressively vast and inventive range of legal theories.
Ironically, the same statute that has allowed harassed employees to
seek justice against harassment has also been used by alleged harassers in
claims against former employers. For example, several men fired for
harassment have brought actions against their former employers by
charging under Title VII that the false accusations against them created a
hostile work environment or were based on discrimination. Most courts
have not recognized these types of claims. 35 In Balazs v. Liebenthal,36 the
plaintiff, a supervisor for AT&T for twenty-two years, claimed he had been
demoted as a result of a charge of sexual harassment. 37 The charge
centered on a skit at a company picnic where the plaintiff presented a
"silver rocket award" (allegedly resembling the male anatomy) to a female
38
employee for quick typing and clerical skills. Several women managers
were offended, claimed they were victims of sexual harassment, and
demanded that the plaintiff be punished.39 The court dismissed the
plaintiff's claim, brought after the demotion, because the claim did not
allege that he had been treated differently because he was a male, a
necessity under Title VII. 40 The court said that an "allegation that... [the
plaintiff] was falsely accused of conduct which, if true, might have given
33. Kristen Hallam, Few Victims of Abuse File Formal Complaints, NASHVILLE
BANNER, Feb. 17, 1997, at D4,availablein 1997 WL 7333251.
34. See Annie Fisher, After All This Time, Why Don't People Know What Sexual
HarassmentMeans?, FORTUNE, Jan. 12, 1998, at 156, availablein 1998 WL 2500833.
35. See ERNEST C. HADLEY & GEORGE M. CHuzi, SExUAL HARASSMENT: FEDERAL LAW
3.I.B.9 (1995 ed.).
36. 32 F.3d 151, 153 (4th Cir. 1994).
37. See id. at 153.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See id. at 155. The plaintiff needed to prove that he was discriminated against
based on his sex because section 703 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, makes it unlawful
for an employer to "fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
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rise to a claim of employment discrimination based on sex by someone else
in no way states a cause of action that plaintiff himself was a victim of
discrimination based on his sex. '4' Thus, absent proof that the company
disciplined its employees differently according to gender, the court refused
to recognize the plaintiff s.claim.
However, even proving that a company treated a male and female
coworker differently may not be enough to ensure that a plaintiff will get
past the summary judgment phase of a trial. In Pierce v. Commonwealth
Life Insurance Co.,42 the plaintiff was demoted after a series of allegedly
harassing acts including giving a female coworker a card which said "Sex
is a misdemeanor. De more I miss, de meanor I get.' 43 The plaintiff
responded that the female worker to whom he had given the card had often
engaged in behavior more off-color and flagrant than his own.44 However,
the court upheld the dismissal of his claim under Kentucky state law
because the court found that the two employees were not similarly
situated. 45 The crucial distinction in the court's mind was that the plaintiff
was a supervisor and the female employee was not. 46 The court agreed
with the lower court's contention that, unlike the female coworker, the
plaintiff "was a member of management, had authority over three offices
and several subordinates, and had a responsibility to maintain a respectful,
respectable, and decorous office. '47 The court further added:
[F]or two or more employees to be considered similarly-situated
for the purpose of creating an inference of disparate treatment in
a Title VII case, the plaintiff must prove that all of the relevant
aspects of his employment situation are 'nearly identical' to those
of the [female] employees who he alleges were treated more
favorably. The similarity between the compared employees must
exist in all relevant aspects of their respective employment
circumstances.48
The benchmark created by the Sixth Circuit is typical of the fairly
rigid tests alleged harassers must pass before their suits can survive
summary judgment.
Some courts have set similarly difficult tests when workers fired for
41. Balazs, 32 F.3d at 155.
42. 40 F.3d 796 (6th Cir. 1994).
43. Id. at 799.
44. See id. The plaintiff claimed that the female coworker had engaged in flirtatious
behavior, sent and shared sexually explicit jokes and cartoons with other workers, and had
even brought a pornographic videotape into the office. See id.
45. See id. at 802 (describing why the two employees were not similarly situated).
46. See id.
47. Id. at 802.
48. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Ruth v. Children's Med. Ctr., 940 F.2d 662 (6th
Cir. 1991)).
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sexual harassment have tried to bring Title VII actions based on race, rather
than gender. In Johnson v. J.C. Penney Co.,49 the plaintiff had been
terminated for allegedly offensive conduct such as unzipping and zipping
his pants, placing his hand on his crotch, asking a female subordinate to
spend the night with him the next time her husband was out of town, and
placing his arm around the female coworker's waist.5 The plaintiff denied
the charges and claimed his offensive conduct was merely a pretext and
that he was truly dismissed because of racial bias.51 The only proof the
plaintiff offered for the pretext claim, however, was a single comment that
a superior had made to him. 2 The court granted summary judgment to the
defendants on the Title VII claims because the plaintiff had produced no
evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to the
pretext issue.53 The court stated that "a single remark, which on its face is
not even racist, cannot provide sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue
of material fact." 54
Similarly, in Baker v. McDonald's Corp.,5 5 an African-American
plaintiff filed suit against his former employer alleging that he had .been
discharged on the basis of his race in violation of Title VII. 56 As in
Johnson, the court granted summary judgment for the employer because
the plaintiff did not satisfy the burden of demonstrating a prima facie case
of discrimination. 7 Even if the plaintiff had met his burden, the court still
would have granted summary judgment because the employer gave a
legitimate, non-discriminatory basis for the discharge.5 ' The court said that
an "employer who shows that there were reasonable grounds to believe that
the discharged employee had made unwelcome sexual overtures to female
employees rebuts any prima facie case presented by the plaintiff."5 9 This
statement by the court shows the latitude the judiciary has allowed
employers on the issue of harassment, even at the expense of the equally
sensitive issue of racial discrimination.
Arguing that a termination for harassment was merely pretext for age
discrimination can also prove difficult for the alleged harasser bringing a

49. 876 F. Supp. 135 (N.D. Tex. 1995).
50. See id. at 136.
51. See id. at 139.
52. See id. After the plaintiff led a prayer at a Christmas party, the superior noted that
plaintiff should have been a preacher. See id.

53. See id.
54. Id.
55. 686 F. Supp. 1474 (S.D. Fla. 1987), affid without opinion, 865 F.2d 1272 (11 th Cir.

1988).
56.
57.
58.
59.

See id. at 1482.
See id.
See id.
Id.
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claim under Title VII. In Agugliaro v. Brooks Brothers, Inc.,60 the plaintiff
was fired by the employer after thirty-three years of service because of a
charge that the plaintiff sexually harassed a subordinate female worker.6'
The plaintiff stated that the allegations were merely a pretext and that his
termination was really based on his age. 62 The court found, however, that
the plaintiff had no grounds to sue the clothing store because Brooks
Brothers had a good faith belief that the plaintiff had engaged in
harassment when it decided to fire him.63 In his opinion, Judge Chin wrote:
[N]o reasonable jury could conclude that defendants' articulated
reason for discharging... [the plaintiff]-that he sexually
harassed a subordinate employee-was pretextual. Indeed, on
the present record, it is clear that plaintiff did engage in
inappropriate sexual conduct with a subordinate employee on the
premises during business hours. Moreover, even assuming for
purposes of this motion that... [plaintiff] did not engage in
inappropriate sexual behavior, defendants fired him because they
believed in good faith that he had, and... [plaintiff] has
presented no evidence to show otherwise.Y
Bad faith could be proven if the plaintiff could show, for example, that
the company knew the allegations against him to be false, but terminated
his employment anyway. 65 This defense of good faith for employers has
been upheld by various other courts and can present a considerable obstacle
for any fired employee accused of harassment.66
This brief survey of Title VII cases demonstrates the stringent tests
courts force an alleged harasser to pass before allowing his claim to reach
the jury. Plaintiffs' lack of success reinforces the tendency of employers to
enact stiff penalties against workers accused of harassment. 67

60. 927 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
61. See id. at 744-45.
62. See id. at 743.
63. See id.
64. Id.
65. See id. at 747.
66. See Waggoner v. City of Garland, 987 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1993); Elrod v. Sears
Roebuck & Co., 939 F.2d 1466, 1468-69 (11th Cir. 1991); Johnson v. Perkins Restaurant,
Inc., 815 F.2d 1220, 1222 (8th Cir. 1987); Godby v. Electrolux, 66 F.E.P Cas. (BNA) 1704
(N.D. Ga. 1994), aff'd without opinion, 58 F.3d 641 (1lth Cir. 1995); DeCinto v. Lawrence
Hosp., 797 F. Supp. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd without opinion, 58 F.3d 641 (1 lth Cir.
1995).
67. It should be noted that Title VII actions by harassers have also been brought under
charges of religious discrimination. See Levitt v. University of Texas, 847 F.2d 221 (5th
Cir. 1988); Evans v. Bally's Health & Tennis Club, Inc., 64 F.E.P. Cas. (BNA) 33 (D. Md.
1994).
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III.

OTHER UNSUCCESSFUL CLAIMS BROUGHT BY ALLEGED HARASSERS

A.

Emotional Distress

Moving away from Title VII claims, alleged harassers have found
equal difficulty suing under the umbrella of an emotional distress claim,
stating that the charges of sexual harassment and the subsequent
termination have caused the accused intense emotional injury. To prove
intentional infliction of emotional distress, most states require that the
conduct of the employer, in handling the investigation of the harassment
charge, be extreme and outrageous. Thus, in Pierce v. Commonwealth Life
Insurance Co.,65 the court found that the defendant employer had not
violated the stringent Kentucky standard of conduct. Its actions were not
"so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all
possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly
intolerable in a civilized community." 69
The court in Johnson v. J.C. Penney, Co. 70 came to this same
conclusion when it granted summary judgment for defendant.7' The court
went so far as to say that even though "an employer's conduct may rise to
the level of illegality, except in the most unusual cases, it is not normally
enough to constitute the 'extreme and outrageous' conduct necessary for
this cause of action." 72 Thus, as with Title VII claims by alleged harassers,
courts tend to set very high standards for plaintiffs to bring a successful
action for emotional distress.
B.

Worker's Compensation

The high bar can also effect plaintiffs who bring worker's
compensation claims. In this scenario, the worker has usually been
demoted for harassment and then asserts that he missed work due to
emotional injuries brought on by the harassment accusations raised against
him. In Maritone v. State of Rhode Island/Registry ofMotor Vehicles," the
plaintiff tried to collect for emotional injuries allegedly caused by other
employees' treatment of him after he had been disciplined for sexual
68. 40 F.3d 796 (6th Cir. 1994).
69. Id. at 805. The court went on to say that for an emotional distress claim to be
successful, the case should be "one in which the recitation of facts to an average member of
the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim
'Outrageous!' Id.
70. 876 F. Supp. 135 (N.D. Tex. 1995).
71. See id.; see also supratext accompanying notes 49-54.
72. Id. at 141 (citing Wilson v. Monarch Paper Co., 939 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1991)).
73. 611 A.2d 384 (R.I. 1992).
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harassment.7 4 The court held that the plaintiff could not collect worker's
compensation benefits because he could not establish that the alleged injury
was caused by his job.75 In examining the causation issue, the court looked
at the source of plaintiffs harassing acts and found that they were not
motivated by factors that sprang from the plaintiff's job, but rather were
motivated by his own sexual cravings and by his desire to take advantage
of the female coworker.76 To succeed with such a claim, the plaintiff
would have to prove demonstrably that his psychological distress was not
caused by his own actions, but by the actions of his employer or other
employees. However, if the court finds that the employer acted correctly in
investigating the charge of harassment, the plaintiff could, in all likelihood,
not collect his worker's compensation payments.77
C. NegligentInvestigation
Courts have also set tough standards for plaintiffs to meet in actions
brought under the rubric of negligent investigation. In Lambert v.
Morehouse,71 the court granted summary judgment for the defendants,
holding that Washington state courts should not recognize a cause of action
for negligent investigation of alleged harassment. The court said that, as a
policy matter, tort liability for negligent investigation is inappropriate in the
employment relationship because "to the extent an employee has an
employment contract requiring specific reasons for dismissal.... the
employer must conduct an adequate investigation or be liable for breach of
that contract."7 9 The court reasoned that the negligence claim simply
reasserts, in a tort context, the charge that the plaintiff's firing breached
contractual promises arising from the employer's disciplinary policies. 0
The court noted that it added nothing to show that the employer breached a
standard of care because the employer would be liable even without this
type of breach.8 ' If the plaintiff is an employee-at-will, the court stated, the
negligence claim conflicts with the employer's8 2right to discharge the
employee for any cause without incurring liability.

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See Crowley v. SAIF Corp., 839 P.2d 236 (Or. Ct. App. 1992).
843 P.2d 1116 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993).
Id. at 1119.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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D. Due Process Claims by Alleged Harassers
Government employees discharged for harassment have also faced a
high bar in getting past summary judgment when suing the government for
violations of substantive and procedural due process rights. Often, these
cases will focus on whether the plaintiff can establish a deprivation of a
definite liberty or property interest. In Rudow v. City of New York,8 3 the
plaintiff, found guilty of sexual harassment by the City Commission on
Human Rights, stated that the employer's failure to disclose the harassed
employee's falsified receipt of medical care deprived him of his
constitutional right to liberty without due process of law. The plaintiff
argued that he had a protected interest as an individual innocent of sexual
harassment.?4 The court found, however, that the plaintiff's liberty interest
as someone innocent of the charges was not constitutionally protected."5
Further, the court stated that the statute describing the parameters of the
City's authority to prosecute sexual harassment complaints did not, without
a separately articulable substantive right, create an interest in liberty
protected by the Constitution. 86
Similarly, in Grassinger v. Welty, the court found a university's
failure to follow its own sexual harassment guidelines in investigating
accusations against a professor did not violate procedural due process. The
court stated that the school's failure to follow its own regulations did not
give the victim of the alleged behavior a protected liberty or property
interest. 88 The court noted that there is neither a liberty nor a property
interest in procedures themselves, and that state administrative policies,
such as the university's, generally do not confer entitlements under state
law.89 The court added that because this particular policy did not confer
any property or liberty interests, even if the university had violated its own
regulations, at most there would have been a violation of state procedural
law, which is beyond the jurisdiction of the federal court. 90
Courts might also give plaintiffs accused of harassment little leeway
in recognizing types of due process they are entitled to before termination.
In Jackson v. St. Joseph State Hospital,91 the plaintiff argued that he had
suffered a due process violation when he received a letter from his
83. 822 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1987).
84. See id. at 325.

85. See id. at 329.
86.
87.
88.
interest
89.

See id. at 330.
818 F. Supp. 862 (W.D. Pa. 1992).
See id. The court did say that a teacher who had gained tenure had a property
in his job and could only be released after notice and a hearing. See id.
See id. at 869.

90. See id.
91. 840 F.2d 1387 (8th Cir. 1988).
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employer indicating that the decision to fire him had already been made.
He was given a chance to convince his superior to change his mind, but
claimed that this opportunity should have preceded the decision to
terminate him. 92 The court held, however, that there was no due process
violation because due process "does not require predecision hearings. It
only requires an opportunity to be heard prior to the termination of
benefits." 93 Since the plaintiff had eleven days to respond before his salary
payments ceased, the court found that there was no violation.9 4
Even when the charges against an employee are proven to be false, the
employee may have a hard time bringing a due process claim. In Workman
v. Jordan,95 a captain in the sheriff's department was fired for making
inappropriate comments in the workplace.9 6 At a grievance hearing, the
hearing officer found that while the plaintiffs comments were sexist and
vulgar, they did not rise to the level of sexual harassment. 97 The captain
was reinstated and granted full back pay, nevertheless, a letter of
reprimand, a letter of termination, and a poor evaluation were placed in the
plaintiffs personnel file. 98 The plaintiff asserted that he was deprived of
both property and liberty without due process of law in violation of the
Constitution; the court dismissed both claims. 99 While admitting that the
plaintiff did have a property interest in continued public employment, the
court found that this interest was not infringed because the employer's
procedures worked when the plaintiff was reinstated and awarded all
necessary back pay.'0° The court also found no deprivation of a liberty
interest in the alleged damage to the plaintiff's reputation because the
stigmatizing documents placed in the personnel file were not false.101 The
court noted that the documents in the file merely repeat the evidence found
to be accurate by the investigation but which the hearing officer did not
find to be sufficient to justify immediate termination.10 2 The court
concluded that the captain was unable to prove that false stigmatizing
statements had become entangled with his interest in employment.' 3

92. See id. at 1391.
93. Id. at 1390.
94. See id.
95. 32 F.3d 475 (10th Cir. 1994).
96. See id. at 477 (describing how the plaintiff was accused of calling women "bimbo,"
"sweetie", and "bitch", and using other inappropriate language).
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See id. at 478.

100.
101.
102.
103.

See id. at 479.
See id. at 481.
See id.
See id.
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E. Defamation
Courts have also placed high hurdles in front of alleged harassers
bringing defamation actions against their former employers. There is a
well-recognized conditional or qualified privilege for an employer to
communicate information about its employees and to give its employees
information regarding the company, as long as the disclosure is not
motivated by malice °4 Thus, in Manning v. Cigna Corp.,0 5 the plaintiff,
terminated for fondling several female workers, brought an action for
defamation against his employer after the defendant employer disclosed to
other workers the nature of the plaintiff's harassing acts. The court, finding
that Cigna had a right to tell employees that the plaintiff had been fired for
106
harassment, granted summary judgment for defendants.
The court stated
that the workers had a real interest in knowing why a fellow employee was
discharged, that the disclosure reiterated the company's sexual harassment
policy, and that "common interest" communications such as these are
protected.1 °7
Similarly, the court in Duffy v. Leading Edge Products, Inc.,'0° held
for the defendant company,'09 but in this case the issue centered on proving
malice. The plaintiff in Duffy was terminated for accosting a fellow
employee in her hotel room during a trade show. ° The plaintiff sued for
defamation, but the court found that because the investigator actually
believed the allegations to be true no actual malice could be proven."' For
the defamation claim to remain, the court found that the plaintiff would
have to show that the investigator "had a high degree of awareness that the
underlying facts as reported to her were probably false."" 2
Duffy also presented a unique twist on the qualified privilege afforded

104. See HENRY H. PERRflT, JR., EMPLOYEE DisMIssAL LAW AND PRACTICE

§ 5.22 (3d

ed. 1992).
105. 807 F. Supp. 889 (D. Conn. 1991).
106. See id. at 899.
107. See id. Similarly, in Moss v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., No. Civ. A. 89-138, 1990
WL 485666, at *5 (D. Vt. Apr. 9, 1990), the court found that the employer had a
conditioned privilege to publish information to certain employees that a worker had been
fired for sexual harassment. Even though the employer did not give the defendant an
opportunity to argue his version of the events, the court did not find that the employer acted
with malice. See id.
108. 44 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 1995)
109. Seeid. at311.
110. Seeid. at310-11.
111. Seeid. at313.
112. Id. at 314. The court did note that where a story is clearly falsified, a profession of
good faith by the investigator probably would not hold up. See id. (citing St. Amant v.
Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968)). However, in this case, the court found no evidence
of fabrication. See id.
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to. employers. In this case, the plaintiff was not suing over a publication by
the company of his termination but over a compelled self-publication
defamation. 113 The plaintiff argued that the defendant company should be
accountable for damages because "it was reasonably foreseeable that he
would as a practical matter be required to tell prospective employers of the
allegedly defamatory reason for his termination."'1 4 The lack of malice on
the part of the employer, however, defeated the claim here." 5 Plaintiffs
attempting to bring a successful defamation action in a situation such as
Duffy face the challenge of proving either malice or a lack of qualified
privilege on the part of the employer.
F.

Wrongful Termination and Breach of Contract

The final claim to be considered in a survey of unsuccessful litigation
brought by alleged harassers is wrongful termination. For a plaintiff to
bring a successful action of this sort which will survive summary judgment,
the plaintiff must prove that he or she had an employment contract for a
term of years. In most states the employment-at-will doctrine is in effect,
meaning that most terminated workers who try to sue under this claim
face
1 16
the burden of demonstrating that an employment contract did exist.
Thus, in Ekokotu v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 7 where the plaintiff had been
discharged for using derogatory language toward female employees, the
court disposed of the claim on summary judgment because there was no
proof of a contract between the plaintiff and his employer.1 The court did
the same in Simpson v. Pizza Hut, Inc.,'1 9 a case involving a plaintiff
discharged under similar circumstances, stating that "any business... is
freely permitted to 'shoot itself in the foot', so to speak when it decides to
terminate seemingly competent and ideal employees like plaintiff ... who
are employed at will.' 20 The court added that, so long as the employer
investigated the complaint, firing for sexual harassment
does not create an
12
'
doctrine.
employment-at-will
the
to
exception

113. See id. at311.
114. See id.
115. Seeid.at31O.
116. The employment at will doctrine provides that "absent express agreement to the
contrary, either employer or employee may terminate their relationship at any time, for any
reason. Such an employment relationship is one which has no specific duration, and... may
be terminated at will by either the employer or the employee, for or without cause."
BLACK'S LAW DICnONARY 525 (6th ed. 1990).

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

422 S.E.2d 903 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).
See id. at 904-06.
Civ. A. No. 89-4312, 1991 WL.236485, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 1991).
Id. at *3.
See id. at *7.
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In Johnson v. J.C. Penney Co.,1 22 the plaintiff tried to avoid his
employment-at-will status by stating that the company manual changed his

working status. The court noted, however, that Texas case law established
that if an employment manual has a disclaimer which states that the manual

does not constitute a contract, that disclaimer will negate any implication
'
that the personnel procedures will restrict the at-will relationship. 2n
Because the defendant's manual had such a disclaimer, the court dismissed
the plaintiff's claim. 124

In Lawson v. Boeing Co.,'12 the plaintiff tried to make a similar escape
from the employment-at-will doctrine by claiming that he had an oral
assurance from his employer that he would retain his job as long as he
performed at an adequate level.126 The court rejected the idea that this oral
promise amounted to a definite contract and dismissed the claim.1 27
Examining these varied unsuccessful claims brought by alleged
harassers, one finds that many courts tend to support employers who
terminate employees for sexual harassment by placing high bars for
plaintiffs to surmount at the summary judgment stage. These high
standards operate regardless of the type of claim brought by the alleged
harasser. These barriers help create, in turn, a judicial impetus for
employers to create and to strictly enforce demanding internal policies
against harassment to aid in limiting their liability. Employers find
themselves in a difficult bind, though, when alleged harassers are
successful in their actions. These successful claims remind employers that
they face potential liability not only from the alleged harassed employee,
but also from the alleged harasser.
IV. SUCCESSFUL CLAIMS BROUGHT BY ALLEGED HARASSERS

Although alleged harassers have been largely unsuccessful in their
cases against employers, 28 courts have been willing to recognize claims by
harassers when the employer's actions are especially egregious. In Valdez
v. Church's Fried Chicken, Inc.,' 29 the court found that the plaintiff, an
alleged harasser, had been discriminated against on the basis of race. This
finding was in part because of the poor investigation of the sexual

122.
70-72.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

876 F. Supp. 135, 140 (N.D. Tex. 1995); see also supra text accompanying notes
See Johnson, 876 F. Supp. at 140.
See id.
792 P.2d 545 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990).
See id. at 547.
See id. at 548.
See Conte, supra note 1, at 35.
683 F. Supp. 596 (W.D. Tex. 1988).
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harassment allegations conducted by the company."3 The court was
troubled by (1) the short length of the investigation (two days), (2) the fact
that no outside lawyer was hired for guidance, (3) the employer's failure to
take a statement from the plaintiff accused of harassment, and (4) the
employer's failure to ask the plaintiff to take a polygraph
test when it had
131
asked others accused of harassment to do in prior cases.
Similarly, in Starishevsky v. Hofstra University,3

the Supreme Court

of Suffolk County, New York found a due process violation in a sexual
harassment case where a university panel fired an administrator who
allegedly kissed a student. 133
The court found that the
administrator/plaintiff did not receive a fair hearing when he was not
informed prior to the disciplinary hearing that, (1) the judging panel was
instructed to look beyond the single allegation of sexual harassment, (2) the
panel was to make a recommendation as to the plaintiff's future
employment, and (3) the employment recommendation need not be based
solely upon whether a finding of sexual harassment was made.' 34 The court
further noted that this lack of essential fairness and good faith in the
hearing process culminated in the panel's finding that the plaintiff was not
guilty of sexual harassment, but that he should nonetheless be terminated
from the university because of behavior which was unethical,
13 5 The court ultimately ordered the
unprofessional, and inappropriate.136
reinstatement of the administrator.
While courts have generally recognized an employer's qualified
privilege for publication,1 37 they have not extended this privilege to
employees. In Garraghty v. Williams,138 the Virginia Supreme Court held
that an employee's sexual harassment allegations did not qualify for a
special privilege. 139 In this case, a female employee sent memos to the
plaintiff, accusing him of sexual harassment.140 After others had seen the
memos, the plaintiff denied the charges against him and filed a defamation
suit. 141 The court permitted the defamation claim go to the jury, which
found that the plaintiff had been defamed. 142 After appeals, the plaintiff
ultimately was awarded $277,597 in compensatory and punitive
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

See id. at 627-28.
See id. at 628-29.
612 N.Y.S.2d 794 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994).
See id. at 796.
See id. at 800.
See id.
See id. at 801.
See PERRrrr, supra note 104.
455 S.E.2d 209 (Va. 1995).
See id. at 216.
See id. at 212.
See id. at 213.
See id. at 227.
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damages. 43
Some recent jury decisions in favor of alleged harassers prompt
serious debates about whether a company was vigorously pursuing a policy
against sexual harassment or was acting unlawfully toward one of its
employees. One such case is Mackenzie v. Miller Brewing Co.,' 44 the socalled Seinfeld case. In March 1993, the Milwaukee-based Miller Brewing
Company fired Jerold Mackenzie, a manager with nineteen years of
service, after coworker Patricia Best complained to her supervisor that
Mackenzie had made her feel terribly uncomfortable.145 Best was troubled
by Mackenzie having described to her the story of the previous night's
episode of Seinfeld, in which comedian Jerry Seinfeld forgets his
girlfriend's name, only remembering that it rhymes with a part of the
female anatomy. 146 At the end of the episode, Seinfeld remembers that his
girlfriend's name is Dolores, rhyming with "clitoris."1 47 Mackenzie, in
describing the episode to Best, did not want to say the word "clitoris" out
loud. Instead, he showed her a photocopied definition of the word from a
dictionary.1 4 Best complained about Mackenzie's actions. Mackenzie was
then called into a meeting to discuss the incident with Miller's in-house and
outside counsel who had already discussed the incident in a meeting with
Miller's then-CEO, Warren Dunn. 149 Eventually the company decided to
terminate Mackenzie, who then sued the company, one of his supervisors,
and the complaining coworker in state court in Milwaukee in 1994.150 In
July 1997, Mackenzie won a $26.6 million jury verdict, consisting of about
$6.6 million in lost future earnings and $20 million in punitive damages
although some of the damages have already been lowered on appeal.!5
Some pundits called the verdict a stinging rejection of the
overzealousness and political correctness that has crept into the
enforcement of sexual harassment policies in some companies. 152 Close
examination of the case reveals that this conclusion is inaccurate. First, the
company based its decision to terminate Mackenzie on more than the one
incident. 53 A month before his discussion of the episode with Best,
Mackenzie had left her a bizarre voice mail message saying that he had

143. See id. at 212.
144. JVR No. 201569, 1997 WL 463195 (Wis. Cir. Ct. July 1997) (LRP Jury).
145. Roger Parloff, Sued If You Do, Sued If You Don't, AM. LAW., Sept. 1997, at 5.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See Tanick, supra note 8, at A19 (arguing that the "Seinfeld" verdict should remind
companies to respect the rights of alleged harassment perpetrators).
153. See Parloff, supra note 145, at 5.
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been out drinking, was "going night-night," that he thought she was a
"special" employee, and that he wanted to get off the phone before he got
too mushy.' 54 In addition, Miller claimed that this incident was just the
latest in a series where Mackenzie had demonstrated poor managerial
skills, including a 1989 incident that led a different female worker to file a
sexual harassment charge against Miller. The company eventually settled
that claim for $16,000 in 1990.155
Second, Mackenzie's cause of action only remotely touched on the
reference to the television program. In fact, Mackenzie's lawyer seemed to
be arguing a claim of wrongful discharge even though Mackenzie's claim
under that theory had actually been dismissed before the trial when the
court deemed Mackenzie to be an employee-at-will. 156 Mackenzie's suit
also was not a defamation claim, as the company does not provide any
negative information about former employees. 157 Instead,
Mackenzie
58
brought his action based on three different tort theories.
The first tort, misrepresentation, stemmed from a 1987 restructuring of
the company in which the company downgraded 700 jobs, including
Mackenzie's, and grandfathered the salaries and benefits of the incumbent
employees filling those positions. 59 Mackenzie claimed that his then
supervisor, Robert Smith, did not explain to Mackenzie that his position
had been downgraded, and that Mackenzie did not learn of the downgrade
until August 1992.160 Mackenzie did not quit when he learned of his
downgrade, but waited until 1994 to sue Miller and Smith claiming that
they had deprived him of the right to make an informed choice in 1987
about whether to look for another job.' 61 The jury believed this theory and
told Miller to pay Mackenzie $6.5 million in compensatory damages and
$18 million in punitive damages and had Smith pay $1,500 in
compensatory and $500,000 in punitive damages (a figure that was later
lowered by the appellate court to $100,000).'62
Mackenzie's next claim was equally obtuse; he argued that Smith had
tortiously interfered with his prospective contract when Smith advised the
company not to promote Mackenzie in 1992. Mackenzie made this
argument even though Smith had nothing to do with the final decision to
pTpmote, and even though Smith's feelings about Mackenzie were not

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

See id. -See id.
""e
See Buchanan,sp"a note .
See Parloff, supranote 145, at 5.
See Buchanan, supranote 5.
See Parloff, supra note 145, at 5.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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proven to be motivated by any sort of discriminatory bias.163 The jury,
however, accepted this claim as well, and ordered Smith to pay an
additional $100,000 for the injury.' 64
Mackenzie's final claim did concern the discussion of the television
episode. Mackenzie argued that Best had also tortiously interfered with his
contract because she was not genuinely offended by his reference to the
Seinfeld episode and had simply used the incident as a pretext to have
Mackenzie fired.165 The jury found this argument persuasive as well and
ordered Best to pay $1.5 million in punitive damages that were eventually
revoked on appeal. 166 The result of the Seinfeld verdict seems to speak
more to the ability of Mackenzie's attorney to blur a number of claims to
convince the jury that Miller had unfairly terminated Mackenzie, even
though he had no cause of action for wrongful termination, than to the
jury's statement that Miller was excessive in its treatment of alleged sexual
harassment violators. As one writer noted, the lesson of the case might be
that "if an employee complains to a supervisor about a colleague's conduct,
and the supervisor and the company's attorney agree with the complaining
employee and therefore take lawful action to punish the offensive conduct,
the complaining employee may incur $1.5 million in liability."' 67
V. POLICY ANALYSIS: SHOULD VERDICTS LIKE THE SEINFELDDECISION
PROMPT COMPANIES TO RECONSIDER THEIR HARASSMENT POLICIES?

The Seinfeld verdict has been viewed as a statement against a
company's knee-jerk reaction to anything that arguably constitutes sexual
harassment. 161 Thus, the jury's large damage award could have been
intended to counter the company's overreaction to sexual harassment
charges, and the harm unfounded allegations can do to an individual's
reputation. 169 When juries, such as the Seinfeld jury, grant large awards to
those accused of sexual harassment, they may be attempting to readjust the
lines of social policy, lines that may have been pushed too far in the
opposite direction by judicial rulings and statutes passed by the legislative
bodies.170 Some think the Seinfeld verdict shows that the jurors were angry
163. See id.
164. See Parloff, supra note 145, at 5.
165. Mackenzie claimed that because Best used sexually charged language around the
office, she could not have been sincerely upset by his comments. See hi
166. See id.
167. Id. at 5.
168. See Spivak, supra note 7, at 1.
169. See id.
170. Jonathan Rauch, the author of "Kindly Inquisitions: The New Attacks on Free
Thought," said the Seinfeld verdict could be "the beginning of a useful backlash" against
limits of on-the-job speech. See Tevlin, supra note 6, at 1A. Also, it should be noted that
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at the way harassment law has been used to harass workers who want to
talk about something other than the latest production figures, and that they
did not want 171a work environment in which a worker must watch every
word spoken.
Those who argue that these verdicts were intended to send a message
cite several factors that have caused companies to overreact to claims of
sexual harassment. The first is fear of liability. One writer observes"
[A] company's legal duty to take prompt corrective action against
sexual harassment seems to call for sanctions to be levied on
those alleged to have committed such harassment in the
workplace, regardless of actual culpability. The presumption of
guilt runs rampant. Imposing discipline ostensibly carries out
management's legal duty while preventing the172business from
exposure to liability for a subsequent occurrence.
The tendency of many courts to dismiss claims brought by alleged
harassers 17 regardless of the theory under which the plaintiff brings his
claim, serves to bolster this attitude by employers, as they could see it to
have an implicit judicial sanction.
A second reason cited for a company's overzealousness in pursuing
harassment charges is political correctness. When companies do not
terminate harassers, "mild sanctions often trigger outcries that reflect
poorly on a company. It is often easier to sweep claimed perpetrators away
rather than risk the antagonism and adverse publicity that can be generated
by failure to take strong measures against alleged wrongdoers."' 174
These arguments fail, however, for a number of reasons. First, it is
hard to glean a cohesive message from any jury verdict. On the surface,
the Seinfeld trial may seem to be about what constitutes a hostile work
environment, but the jury verdict really seems to owe more to Mackenzie's
lawyer's adept skill at blending different claims to bring an otherwise
impossible wrongful termination suit. The Seinfeld verdict should actually
or what one writer said
be viewed not as a harbinger, but as an aberration,
175
should be promoted as "the Twilight Zone case."'
Second, the same strong policy reasons that originally supported
sexual harassment policies in companies carry the same force today.
this "backlash" may not be drawn along gender lines as only two members of the Seinfeld
jury that found for the plaintiff were male. See L. A. TIMES, supranote 5, at D1.
171. See Joanne Jacobs, Crossroads:Where's the Middle Ground in Cases Like MillerSeinfeld?, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, July 27, 1997, at 3, available in 1997 WL 12740240
(arguing that the jurors were probably feeling more oppressed by workplace censorship than
by workplace boorishness).
172. Tanick, supra note 8, at A19.
173. See discussion infra Parts I-IH.
174. Tanick, supra note 8, at A19.
175. See Parloff, supra note 145, at 5.
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Reviewing statistics concerning harassment of women indicates that
anywhere from 42% to 90% of women experience sexual harassment at
some point in their lives. Only 1% to 7% of all women who report sexual
harassment in surveys actually file formal complaints, usually because they
fear retaliation or loss of privacy. About 25% of harassed women use leave
time to avoid the situation, and of those who report sexual harassment,
about half just try to ignore it while 5% quit their jobs. 76 Thus, the
problem of sexual harassment remains a serious one, and companies need
to continue to address violations, motivated not by political correctness, but
by recognition of a legal obligation to stop harassment of which
management is aware, even if no one has complained.
If courts have appeared to favor companies by often not allowing suits
by alleged harassers to survive summary judgment, it may be because the
federal mandate embodied in Title VII was given to businesses with little
or no suggestion of how to implement it. Thus, "having saddled employers
with the responsibility to transform gender norms-making them
'instruments of social policy,' in the words of employment law specialist
Steven Berlin-is it fair to turn around and punish them for executing that
responsibility in good faith?, 177 California recently joined Nevada, New
Mexico, Oregon, and Washington in answering "no" to this question, when
the California Supreme Court ruled that jurors in wrongful termination
trials need not decide whether the accusations are true, but only whether the
employer in good faith believed after a reasonable investigation that the
misconduct occurred. 171 Justice Janice R. Brown warned that effective
decision making in the workplace would be "thwarted" if an employer was
"required to have in hand a signed confession or an eyewitness account,"' 79
before it could act.
Even given this posture by some courts, fears that alleged harassers
could be denied essential procedural protections are unfounded when the
case law is closely examined. While many courts have set the bar high for
claims of alleged harassers to survive summary judgment, cases like
Starishevsky v. Hofstra University' 8° and Valdez v. Church's Fried
Chicken"' indicate that courts will allow claims to go forward when
176. See Kristen Hallam, Few Victims of Abuse File Formal Complaints, NASHVILLE
Feb. 17, 1997, availablein 1997 WL 7333251.
177. Ruth Shalit, Sexual Healing: The Accused Get Even, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 27, 1997,
at 17, availablein 1997 WL 9026258.
178. See Gail Diane Cox, Calif Court: OK to Fire in Good Faith, The Falsely Accused
Will Have Tougher Time Suing, NAT'LL.J., Jan. 19, 1998, at B1.
179. Id.
180. 612 N.Y.S.2d. 794 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994); see also supra note 132 and
accompanying text.
181. 683 F. Supp. 596, 627-28 (W.D. Tex. 1988); see also supra note 129 and
accompanying text.
BANNER,
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alleged harassers have been denied essential procedural rights. As the
court observed in Starishevsky, the "process of eliminating sexual
harassment must go forward with recognition of the rights of all involved
and without the creation of new wrongs. The process must be propelled by
a sense of fairness and not motivated by any other less appropriate
notions. 182 In the face of the general befuddlement which afflicts
legislators and business leaders alike in trying to define the parameters of
harassing actions, the current policy of many companies to vigorously rid
their businesses of sexual harassment violators should remain in place. The
concept of sexual harassment is still relatively new to American society and
culture, and until complete acceptance of sexual harassment as a crime has
become the norm in the business community, the harm that could come
from turning a blind eye to harassment claims by potential victims
outweighs the concern for excessive discipline toward alleged harassers.
With the recognition and the definition of harassment in such a volatile,
indefinite state, the process described above by the court in Starishevsky is
best served by American businesses continuing to take a vigilant, active
role in the struggle to eliminate sexual harassment violations.

182. 612 N.Y.S.2d. at 794.

